By Rob Hagy, Law Offices of Rob Hagy, P.C., 154 Hansen Road, Suite 202B, Charlottesville, Virginia. Call (434)293-4562 for more information or email for more information at firstname.lastname@example.org. I look forward to helping you!
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In the case of Wiencko v. Takayama, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, ruled that the trial court erred in considering husband’s separate property retirement accounts in awarding wife the totality of marital retirement accounts. However, the Virginia Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in its custody determination, in considering report of guardian ad litem or imposing certain travel restrictions on the wife.
-Rob Hagy, Charlottesville Divorce Lawyer. For help with issues like these, please call me at (434)293-4562 or email me at email@example.com
In the case of Lewis v. Lewis, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, upheld a trial court’s award of a pension plan and a profit sharing account to wife and an award of of attorney’s fees to wife. But, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled the trial court did not have authority to order the husband to obtain life insurance listing wife as beneficiary to make up for the husband's destruction of wife's right to a lifetime pension under the the parties' property settlement agreement. The trial court properly calculated husband's monthly pension plan. As for the profit sharing plan, wife was entitled to interest which accrued on her share of the profit sharing plan from the date of separation until the date of distribution. Contrary to husband's position, the court had sufficient information before it to rule on the parties' financial ability to pay for their attorneys fees and the wife was not precluded from admitting evidence of her fees up until the time of argument because the case was not set to conclude until that argument.
In the case of Cassell v. Cassell, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, upheld a trial court ruling that the division of husband’s retirement benefits should not be limited to husband’s salary as of the date of separation. Code Section 20-107.3(G) defines the marital share of a retirement plan as "that portion of the total interest, the right to which was earned during the marriage and before the last separation of the parties . . . ." The formula used by courts in dividing the marital share of pensions sets the numerator as the number of years from the date of marriage until the date of separation and the denominator is the number of years the employee is employed until retirement. In this appeal, husband is asking the court to adopt a different formula based on his salary as of the date of separation becasue he believes that wife will unfairly benefit from any post-marital salary increases. However, the formula used by the trial court takes into consideration the pre-marital and post-marital contributions because the fraction diminishes the marital share in relation to the number of years that pre- and post-marital contributions are made.
In the case of Reese v. Reese, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished decision, ruled that the trial court correctly denied a mother’s request for a continuance of a custody hearing where she failed to exercise diligence in securing attendance of child witness and correctly determined the father's child care costs. However, the trial court erred in its determination of the appropriate marital share of father’s military pension.
Mother failed to subpoena the child witness, the parties' daugther, instead relying on the fact that she listed in the child in her witness list. At trial, father failed to bring the daughter with him. Mother sought a continuance and the trial court ruled the father mother failed to exercise due dilligence in seeking the daughter's attendance at trial. Due diligence requires, at a minimum, that a party attempt to subpoena the witness or provide a reasonable explanation why a subpoena was not issued.
Wife also contends that the trial court erred in finding that husband spent $800.00 per month in child care costs based upon his testimony alone. The trial court accepted the testimony without corroboration finding that the amount was not unreasonable. Because the credibility of a witness and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the trial court determine, the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the decision to accept the oral testimony alone as proof of the child care costs.
As for the matter of the military pension, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled the trial court made a mistake by excluding vrom consideration that portion of the military pension acquired by husband while they were only temporarily separated.
In the case of Strausbaugh v. Strausbaugh, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that Wife was entitled to share of Husband's pension from the last company he worked for even though the parties' divorce decree only gave Wife a share of Husband's pension from an earlier company for which he worked. The last company was a successor in interest to the company mentioned in the decree. Therefore, the pension mentioned in the decree was the same as that of the last company for whom the Husband worked.
In the case of Strausbaugh v. Strausbaugh, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the trial court did not err in awarding wife half of the marital share of husband's pension pursuant to terms of parties' final decree of divorce.
In Cote v. Cote, the Virginia Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, ruled that the trial court did not err in finding husband responsible for $100,000 in debt incurred prior to the parties’ final separation, in awarding husband only forty percent of wife’s retirement account, and in awarding wife spousal support.
In a case involving current and retired members of the armed forces challenging law allowing their retirement pay to be divided in state divorce proceedings, dismissal of individual plaintiffs' claims, and summary judgment in favor of defendant on association's claims, were affirmed by the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Adkins v. Rumsfield, as, although the district court erred in finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the individual plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs failed to state cognizable claims against the constitutionality of the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act under substantive and procedural due process, the armed forces clause, the full faith and credit clause, and equal protection.
In the case of Turner v. Turner, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in entering the Qualified Domestic Relations Order as the QDRO was an administrative mechanism to effectuate the intent and purpose of the final decree’s award pursuant to the Court's authority as stated in Va. Code Section 20-107(K)(4).
Virginia Code Section 20-108.2 This provision of Virginia law sets forth the child support guidelines-a table of reference for determining the base monthly child support obligation.
Virginia Code Section 20-124.3 This statute sets forth the factors that a court will consider in divorce proceedings, temporary proceedings, or modification proceedings to determine what custody and visitation arrangement would be best for the child or children involved.